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FOR NEARLY A DECADE, money stock objectives have been announced 
publicly  by the Federal  Reserve Board,  and, for much  longer,  observers 
have focused on the money stock as an indicator  or guide to monetary 
policy. Also in the past decade, the financial  system  has undergone  rapid 
change-through  spontaneous market developments and regulatory 
reforms-and this change  has implications  for the relationship  between 
money and  other  macroeconomic  variables.  The  public  has been offered 
a growing  array  of new or modified  financial  assets, including  assets that 
can be used for making payments. Negotiable orders of withdrawal 
(NOW  accounts), which  are  functionally  equivalent  to demand  deposits 
except that  they yield interest,  have spread  nationwide  over this period; 
moreover,  in early 1983  interest-rate  ceilings  were lifted  on those NOW 
accounts that qualify, in terms of size, as Super NOWs. In addition, 
money market mutual  funds have become widely available over this 
period, and the money market deposit account has been introduced; 
both  have limited  checking  privileges  and  other  transactions  capabilities. 
Management  of cash has also been facilitated by greatly improved 
availability  of other liquid investments, such as overnight  repurchase 
agreements  and Eurodollars. 
The potential  liquidity  of portfolios  has been enhanced  further  by an 
expanding  array  of credit services, especially revolving  credit  lines. At 
the retail level, commercial  banks and a growing number  of financial 
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organizations  offer consumers  lines of credit  that are secured  by equity 
in real estate or holdings  of securities, many  of which are accessible by 
check. 
At the same time, the payments system has been changing-most 
visibly  in the form  of electronic  funds  transfers-and with  these changes 
the effective cost of making  transactions  has been declining, thereby 
encouraging  other adjustments  to portfolio behavior. Meanwhile, de- 
positors  have responded  to the generally  high  level of interest  rates that 
have prevailed  since the latter  part  of the 1970s  by intensifying  efforts  to 
reduce  holdings  of monetary  assets having  relatively  low or zero explicit 
yields. 
Under these circumstances, it would be surprising  if the money- 
income relationship had not been disturbed or altered. This paper 
examines recent and prospective changes to the relationship  among 
money, interest rates, and income, focusing on the MI measure  of the 
money stock. Even though  reduced  policy weight  has been given to MI 
in the past couple of years, observers  have continued  to direct  much  of 
their  attention  to this aggregate.  Also, a number  of the changes  affecting 
MI are affecting the broader measures of the money stock as well; 
indeed,  with regard  to the effects of deregulation  of interest  rate  ceilings, 
the broader  measures  might  be viewed as being  in a more  advanced  state 
of evolution.  ' 
In the next section I present  a variety  of evidence suggesting  that  the 
MI-income relationship  has indeed  been changing  over the past  decade, 
especially over the past few years. The evidence of change is followed 
by a more  detailed  investigation  of the large  rise in MI relative  to income 
in 1982-83,  focusing  on the role  of NOW  accounts.  From  there  I examine 
likely future changes to the financial  system that can be expected to 
influence the money-income relationship  both in a transitional  and a 
permanent  way and thus affect the reliability  of the money stock as a 
guide to policy. In the final  section I focus on the likely contours  of the 
money-income relationship  once the system has adapted  to current  and 
prospective change. In particular,  I examine the following questions: 
Can the narrow  money stock be a reliable  guide to policy? If so, what 
are the implications  of changes in the financial  system for setting and 
adjusting  money stock objectives and  monetary  control  procedures? 
1. Some special difficulties of the broader  measures are explored in Thomas D. 
Simpson  and  Patrick  Parkinson,  "Some  Implications  of Financial  Innovation  in  the United 
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Empirical Evidence 
A variety of empirical  evidence suggests that changes in the avail- 
ability of financial  assets, in the opportunity  costs of holding money 
balances,  and  in  transactions  costs have  disrupted  and  altered  the  relation 
between money stock measures and the economy. Around the mid- 
1970s,  and  again  in 1981,  times when interest  rates  were falling,  MI grew 
slowly relative  to the gross national  product;  there  evidently  were large 
downward  shifts in the demand  for narrow  money  balances  during  these 
periods.2  The strong  rise in MI velocity was followed by its exceptional 
weakness  through  1983:1.  Velocity  of Ml contracted  at  an  unprecedented 
5.5 percent  annual  rate  from 1981:4  to 1983:1  and  expanded  at only about 
a 2 percent  annual  rate  over the remainder  of 1983,  an unusually  sluggish 
expansion  during  the early stage of economic recovery. 
Econometric evidence confirms the impression that the money- 
income relationship  has departed  recently  from  historical  norms.  Table 
1 shows forecast errors  from a St. Louis-type, reduced-form  equation 
relating  growth  in nominal  GNP to contemporaneous  and  lagged  growth 
in M  I and  a fiscal  variable;  this  approach  allows  for  lags  between  changes 
in money and income, and thus forecasts from such an equation  should 
be affected less than velocity by large variations  in money growth.3  In 
1981,  the equation  registered  quite  sizable  misses, although  these misses 
tended  to be offsetting  from  one quarter  to the next, with little  tendency 
to underpredict  or overpredict  over the year as a whole. By contrast,  in 
1982  the equation  began  to overpredict  GNP growth  systematically;  the 
overprediction  was greatest-at  a 13.1 percent annual  rate-in  1982:4 
2.  See John  P. Judd  and  John  L. Scadding,  "The Search  for a Stable  Money  Demand 
Function:  A Survey  of the Post-  1973  Literature,  " Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 20 
(September  1982),  pp. 993-1023. Behavior  of MI velocity in 1981  should  be viewed  in the 
context  of the introduction  of NOW  accounts  nationwide,  which  boosted  the demand  for 
MI as funds were shifted from non-MI sources to newly opened NOW accounts. It is 
estimated  that  after  allowing  for these effects MI velocity rose 8 percent  from  the fourth 
quarter  of 1980  to the fourth  quarter  of 1981  in comparison  with the 5/2 percent  increase 
shown  in the actual  MI figures. 
3. Reduced-form  equations  of this type do not incorporate  explicitly  an interest  rate 
influence  on the money-income relationship  but incorporate  such an influence only 
indirectly  through  growth  in money  and  the fiscal  variable.  To the extent  that  the reduced- 
form  relationship  is misspecified,  predictive  performance  will diminish  relative  to that  of 
a better-specified  money demand  equation-with the predictive  performance  tending  to 
erode  directly  with  the size of the interest-elasticity  of money  demand. 252  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 1.  St. Louis Equation Simulation Resultsa 
Error 
Year  and  Actual  Predicted  (actual less 
quarter  GNP growthb  GNP growthb  predicted) 
1981:1  20.5  12.4  8.1 
2  6.6  16.5  -  9.9 
3  13.3  6.5  6.8 
4  3.7  10.2  -6.5 
1982:1  -  1.4  9.6  -  11.0 
2  6.6  5.2  1.4 
3  2.7  13.3  -  10.6 
4  2.5  15.6  -  13.1 
1983:1  8.2  11.2  -  3.0 
2  13.3  17.2  -  3.9 
3  11.5  19.0  -  7.5 
4  9.1  11.4  -2.3 
1984:1  12.8  10.8  2.0 
a. Model  is available  from  author  on request. 
b. Seasonally  adjusted  annual  rates. 
(which also happens to have been when the Federal Open Market 
Committee elected to de-emphasize the MI measure). The equation 
continued  to overpredict  throughout  1983,  but  to a much  smaller  extent, 
and  it slightly  underpredicted  GNP growth  in 1984:1. 
Similar  evidence of a departure  from historical  MI-income patterns 
can be found  in predictions  derived  from  money-demand  models, which 
incorporate  an interest-rate  impact  directly.  Table  2 presents  simulation 
errors of standard  and nonlinear  M1 demand models. (The nonlinear 
model  results in table 2 are discussed in the next section.) The standard 
model is a Goldfeld-type  money-demand  equation  relating  real money 
balances  (through  a distributed  lag)  to real  income  and  interest  rates;  the 
equation  used was estimated through  mid-1974,  just prior to evident 
downward  shifts in money demand.  This type of specification  is based 
on an inventory  approach  to the demand  for transactions  balances, and 
it  explained  M  I behavior  quite  well prior  to the  mid-  1970s.  The  prediction 
errors in table 2 for 1982 and 1983 show a pattern that is broadly 
consistent  with the reduced-form  equation  errors  of table 1;  the money- 
demand  equation  systematically  underpredicts  MI growth  in 1982  and 
1983  until 1983:4.  However, the size of the forecast  errors  is on balance 
much smaller, in large measure  because the effect of interest rates on 
money demand  is allowed for explicitly. Because of the sharp  drop in Thomas D.  Simpson  253 
Table 2.  Actual and Predicted Ml  Growth from Standard 
and Nonlinear Ml  Demand Modelsa 
Addendum 
Absolute  change 
Error  (billions  of dollars) 
Year  Actual  Predicted  Ml growthb  (actual  less predicted)  Other 
and  Ml  Standard  Nonlinear  Standard  Nonlinear  checkable 
quarter  growthb  model  model  model  model  Ml  deposits 
1981:1  4.6  6.5  10.1  -1.9  -5.5  4.7  25.2 
2  8.0  8.5  5.3  -0.5  2.7  8.4  13.3 
3  3.1  7.8  4.7  -4.7  -  1.5  3.4  5.4 
4  4.6  9.6  10.3  -  5.0  -5.8  4.9  4.3 
1982:1  10.3  5.4  9.2  4.9  1.1  11.2  8.4 
2  2.2  1.8  6.1  0.4  -3.9  2.5  3.2 
3  6.1  4.3  6.5  1.8  -0.4  6.9  4.7 
4  15.4  6.7  8.5  8.7  6.9  17.6  9.1 
1983:1  12.8  6.9  11.3  5.9  1.5  15.2  10.6 
2  11.6  6.7  10.2  4.9  1.4  14.3  7.9 
3  9.5  6.9  7.0  2.6  2.5  11.9  6.3 
4  4.8  7.7  6.4  -2.9  -  1.6  6.2  2.9 
1984:1  7.2  8.1  6.8  -0.9  0.4  9.4  5.2 
a. Standard  and nonlinear  models are available  from the author  on request. Predictions  are from a dynamic 
simulation  starting  in 1974:3. 
b. Seasonally  adjusted  annual  rates  (not compounded). 
interest  rates  following  mid-1982,  this  model  predicted  a pickup  in money 
growth  in the second half  of 1982  and  the first  half  of 1983.  Nevertheless, 
the largest underpredictions  occurred in 1982:4  and 1983:1. Forecast 
errors diminished  over 1983, a period when interest rates varied less 
than they had prior to late 1982; in the last two quarters  shown, the 
model  overpredicted  growth  in Ml. 
Possible Explanations  of Recent Behavior 
Much of the attention  given to explaining  very strong  Ml growth  in 
1982  and  early 1983,  a time of recession and  early  recovery, has focused 
on  the  contribution  of the sharp  drop  in short-term  interest  rates  following 
mid-year 1982.4  Work by the Federal Reserve Board staff has been 
4. See Flint Brayton,  Terry  Farr,  and Richard  Porter,  "Alternative  Money Demand 
Specifications  and Recent Growth  in MI" (Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve 
System,  Division  of Research  and  Statistics,  May 1983);  John  P. Judd  and  Rose McElhat- 
tan, "The  Behavior  of Money  and  the Economy  in 1982-83,"  Economic  Review,  Federal 254  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
directed  at the other-checkable-deposit  component  of MI, mostly  NOW 
accounts, which is responsible  for most of the strength  in MI over 1982 
and 1983.5  This work is reflected  in the nonlinear  model whose results 
are presented  in table 2. The model explicitly  incorporates  the different 
own rates  of return  (yields)  on different  classes of M  I deposits-ordinary 
NOW accounts can earn up to a 5.25 percent rate of return  and Super 
NOWs earn an unregulated  rate of return-and  thus includes their 
different  opportunity  costs. Changes  in market  rates  have their  greatest 
relative impact on the opportunity cost  of holding ordinary NOW 
accounts, which are subject  to a fixed-rate  ceiling. For example, a drop 
in market rates from 13 percent to 9 percent-a  decline of roughly a 
third-would  reduce the opportunity  cost of holding such NOW ac- 
counts, yielding 5.25 percent, by half, from nearly  8 percentage  points 
to nearly  4 percentage  points. 
The relationship  among  the elasticity  of the demand  for a component 
of money with respect to the open-market  rate of interest, the elasticity 
with respect to the opportunity  cost, and the own rate paid on money 
balances  is given by 
(1)  Em,i`E,  io  n  Eio,i, 
where Em,i  is the elasticity with respect to the market  rate, Em,io  is the 
elasticity with respect to the opportunity  cost, and  Eio,i  is the elasticity 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco  (Summer  1983),  pp. 46-51; Milton  Friedman,  "Why a 
Surge  in Inflation  Is Likely  Next Year," Wall  Street  Journal,  September  1, 1983;  and  John 
A. Tatom, "Was the 1982  Velocity Decline Unusual?"  Review  of the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank, vol. 65 (August/September  1983), pp. 5-15. Friedman  and Tatom both 
maintain  that  the weakness  in MI velocity in 1982  and 1983  was consistent  with  historical 
experience.  Neither  explanation  places  much  emphasis  on the changing  opportunity  costs 
of holding  M  I balances,  although  theory  would  imply  that  the  growing  availability  of NOW 
and Super  NOW  accounts  having  own yields will affect  the relation  between  the amount 
of money  demanded  and  income.  Both  Friedman  and  Tatom  employ  ad  hoc  methodologies, 
and  their  conclusions  suggest  that  large  departures  of MI velocity from  historical  norms 
could  occur  again.  Friedman's  interpretation  implies  that  a sudden  change  in uncertainty 
or large  swings  in interest  rates could lead to such a result, while Tatom's  findings  imply 
that  departures  could  stem  from  large  swings  in the degree  of slack  in the economy. 
5. Brayton, Farr, and Porter, "Alternative  Money Demand Specifications."  This 
model imposes the same elasticity with respect to the opportunity  cost on both other 
checkable deposits and demand deposits, based on the assumption  that transactions 
motives  underly  the demand  for both  components.  To the extent  that  liquid  asset motives 
also affect  the demand  for other  checkable  deposits,  opportunity  cost elasticities  might  be 
different;  for example,  the interest  elasticity  of other  checkable  deposits  would  be greater 
if  liquid  asset  elasticities  were  above  transaction  elasticities,  a situation  that  seems  plausible 
based  on estimates  of the interest  elasticity  of passbook  savings  accounts. Thomas D.  Simpson  255 
of the opportunity  cost with respect to the market  interest rate. When 
money balances  earn interest (in),  the elasticity of the opportunity  cost 
with respect to the market  rate  can be expressed as 
(2)  Ei  i  =  -  _\in)  i 
With  a fixed own rate, 41, less than the market  rate, equation  2 reduces 
to 
(3)  Ejo  >1 
1 -i 
and  thus 
(4)  Emi  =  Em,  io 
Consequently,  for a given Em,jo  the elasticity of the demand  for compo- 
nents having a fixed own yield will be greater  than for those having a 
zero yield. 
The interest elasticities in the nonlinear  model can be summarized 
briefly.  The level of the elasticity of money demand  with respect to the 
opportunity  cost, Em,ic,  varies directly with the size of the opportunity 
cost. Thus  Emio  is smaller  for NOW accounts  than  for demand  deposits. 
However, a larger  Ejo,j  associated  with  NOW  accounts  more  than  offsets 
the lower  elasticity  with  respect  to the opportunity  cost, yielding  a higher 
elasticity of demand  for ordinary  NOW accounts with respect to the 
market  rate. By contrast, the miodel  yields an elasticity of demand  for 
Super NOWs with respect to market  rates below that of both demand 
deposits  and  ordinary  NOWs. If the yield  on Super  NOWs  is proportional 
to the market  rate, then Ejo,j  will be unity and the market-rate  elasticity 
for Super NOWs will equal their opportunity  cost elasticity, Emio.  But 
in the empirical  nonlinear  model, E,njo  is small when the spread  of the 
market  rate  over the own rate  is narrow,  so that  the market  rate  elasticity 
for Super  NOWs is also low. 
The 1982-83  forecast errors  for the nonlinear  model (table  2) show it 
predicted  considerably stronger  MI demand  than the standard  model 
and averaged  smaller  errors. For 1983  the nonlinear  model quite accu- 
rately predicted the rapid first-half  growth of MI that followed the 
January 1983 introduction  of Super NOWs. The predictions of both 
models  were  poor  for 1981  and  for 1982:4.  In 1983:4  and 1984:  1,  however, 256  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
the nonlinear  model's forecast errors  were very small, about one half 
those for the standard  model. 
It is important  to note that  the revised  model  implies  that  the elasticity 
of the demand  for MI with respect to the open market  rate  has changed 
with the growing importance  of NOW accounts; market-rate  interest 
elasticity has risen, according  to this model, as the proportion  of NOW 
accounts subject to fixed ceilings has grown. The revised model also 
implies that in the future the market rate elasticity will fall as the 
proportion  of MI that is subject  to an unregulated  own rate grows; the 
model predicts the drop in elasticity because of the direct relationship 
between the (absolute value of) Emio  and the level of the opportunity 
cost, which  diminishes  as more  MI earns  an unregulated  rate  of interest, 
and  because of the decline toward  unity  in Eio,i  as regulatory  restrictions 
on the own rate  are removed. 
Another model, developed by staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco, explains  an even greater  portion  of strong  MI growth  in 
the last half of 1982 and the first half of 1983 because it contains an 
appreciably  larger elasticity of MI with respect to the open market 
interest  rate.6 Adherents  of this  model  argue  that  the  open  market  interest 
rate elasticity has not changed  in recent years with the growing  impor- 
tance of NOW accounts, in contrast  to the implications  of the nonlinear, 
Federal Reserve Board staff model. The model is estimated over a 
sample period beginning  in the mid-1970s  and has a long-run  interest 
elasticity that (in absolute value) exceeds  -0.15.  There is reason to 
doubt such a large elasticity estimate; similarly specified equations 
estimated  over longer  sample  periods, beginning  in the late 1950s  or the 
1960s,  generally  have MI interest elasticities of approximately  -0.10. 
Indeed,  the San  Francisco  model  itself  yields  a long-run  interest  elasticity 
of about - 0.10 when the sample period starts at the end of the 1950s, 
which is more in line with elasticities of the standard  and nonlinear 
quarterly  models. 
The San Francisco model implies that MI velocity will vary more 
with swings in interest  rates than  historical  analysis  over longer  periods 
would  suggest, even though  the opportunity  cost of holding  MI deposits 
will tend to vary less as the process of deregulation  continues. As a 
consequence,  this  approach  would  suggest  that  relatively  large  variations 
in money stock growth objectives will be required  to stabilize income 
6. See Judd  and  McElhattan,  "The Behavior  of Money  and  the Economy." Thomas D.  Simpson  257 
growth  during  periods  when shifts in spending  imply  large  variations  in 
interest rates. One should be skeptical about how the San Francisco 
model  will perform  in the future.  First, it embodies  an elasticity  that,  for 
no apparent underlying reason, is noticeably above those of other 
models. Second, by not incorporating  differing  own rates  on the various 
MI components, it cannot capture the influence of further  growth in 
Super  NOWs and deregulation  of other  MI components. 
It appears  that MI growth  in late 1983  and  early 1984  has been about 
in line with forecasts  from  models  of money demand,  especially  those of 
the nonlinear  model. Nevertheless, even that  econometric  model  did  not 
capture  well the behavior  of MI in the past few years, a period  during 
which the range of monies and near-monies  has expanded  further  and 
opportunity  and transactions  costs have been changing.  Compounding 
current  uncertainties  about the underlying  behavior  of MI is the likeli- 
hood that  the money-income  relationship  is in transition,  with  questions 
remaining  about what the ultimate  pattern  will be and the rate at which 
progress  toward  such a pattern  is occurring. 
Characteristics  of the Money-Income Relationship  in the Future 
The process of deregulating  the nontransactions  components  of the 
broader  money stock measures  is drawing  to a close. This  process  began 
with the introduction in mid-1978 of the six-month money market 
certificate  having a market-determined  ceiling; it was aided greatly by 
authorization  of the money market  deposit account  in late 1982  and  was 
nearly  completed  on October  1, 1983,  by the removal  of rate  ceilings  and 
minimum  denomination  requirements  on time deposits with maturities 
of 32 days or longer.7 
DEREGULATION  AND  TRANSACTIONS  DEPOSITS 
For  transactions  deposits-that is, M1-the  process has  much  further 
to go. Although  interest-bearing  MI deposits  currently  account  for  about 
7. Still  subject  to rate  ceilings  are  passbook  savings  accounts-amounting  to less than 
15  percent  of M2-and a negligible  amount  of time  deposits  with  maturities  of 7 to 31 days 
issued  in denominations  below $2,500  (such  time  accounts  in denominations  of more  than 
$2,500  have  been deregulated).  The deregulation  of savings  deposits  and  7- to 31-day  time 
deposits  in denominations  below $2,500  is scheduled  for early 1986. 258  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
a quarter  of M  1, unregulated  M  I deposits-Super NOWs-make up  only 
8 percent of this monetary aggregate. Under current schedules, the 
deregulation  of remaining  NOW accounts will be completed in early 
1986.  Moreover,  Congress  has been giving  serious  attention  to removing 
the statutory  prohibition  on the payment  of interest  on demand  deposits, 
a move which  would  enable  businesses-the  major  money stock holders 
not eligible for NOWs-to  earn explicit interest on balances held in 
checking accounts. Competitive pressures and experience thus far 
suggest that rates offered on unregulated  MI deposits will tend toward 
rates prevailing  in the open market  on very short-term  instruments  of 
comparable  risk, after allowing for the costs of intermediation.  Inter- 
mediation costs include the costs to depositories of managing  liquid 
assets used to ensure redemption of balances subject to immediate 
withdrawal  and costs of holding  non-interest-earning  reserves to meet 
reserve requirements.  (At a market  interest  rate  of 10  percent  this latter 
cost tends toward 120  basis points at the margin.)  The tendency  for the 
rate  on MI deposits to be near  open market  rates  would  be strengthened 
if interest  were  paid  on required  reserves  against  such  deposits;  Congress 
is addressing  this issue in regard  to reserve balances  held at the Federal 
Reserve against  Super  NOWs and money market  deposit accounts. 
With further  deregulation,  competitive pressures  are likely to drive 
down significantly  the opportunity  cost of holding  MI balances in the 
form of ordinary  NOW accounts and, in the event of legislative  action, 
demand  deposits. In addition  to being much smaller,  opportunity  costs 
of such MI deposits can be expected to vary by much smaller  amounts 
than open market rates, although perhaps proportionately  to market 
yields.8 A halving of the opportunity  cost amounts  to only a 60-basis- 
point change when the initial  level of the opportunity  cost is 120  basis 
points;  the corresponding  change  in open market  rates  might  be 500  basis 
points, as would be the case if rates fell from 10 percent to 5 percent. 
8. It is possible that depositories  would only sluggishly  adjust  their  offering  rates to 
movements  in open market  rates, perhaps  giving  rise to changes  in the opportunity  cost in 
the short  run, in basis-point  terms, that are close to changes  in the market  rate. In other 
words,  prior  to full adjustment  of offering  rates  by depositories,  the percentage  change  in 
the  opportunity  cost could  exceed that  of the market  rate  and  the sensitivity  of M  l deposits 
to open market  rates could be greater. Competitive  pressures  and large responses of 
deposits  to such  disequilibria  would  be expected  to encourage  relatively  prompt  adjustment 
of offering  rates, especially on those accounts that are most sensitive to variations  in 
opportunity  costs. Thomas D.  Simpson  259 
The public  is likely to be much  less responsive  to proportionate  changes 
in the opportunity  cost of holding MI balances when the level of the 
opportunity  cost is very small, as in this example, than  when it is large. 
Consequently,  the elasticity of MI with respect to the open market  rate 
is likely to be relatively small once the deregulation  of MI deposits is 
complete, a property embodied in the nonlinear  quarterly  model dis- 
cussed in the previous section. 
With a much smaller opportunity  cost of holding MI deposits, the 
demand  for this aggregate  could be buffeted more than it has been by 
shifting  preferences  for assets. The cost of retaining  in MI the proceeds 
of maturing  assets or asset sales before reinvesting  would be reduced, 
and MI deposits would become a more attractive  repository  of specu- 
lative balances when depositors anticipate  that longer-term  rates will 
rise.9 Other  factors affecting  the demand  for liquidity, such as shifting 
concerns about  the outlook  for employment  and earnings,  may come to 
play'a  more  important  role in affecting  the demand  for MI as it becomes 
a more  attractive  portfolio  asset. In late 1981  and  early 1982  the demand 
for NOW accounts, passbook savings, and other very liquid assets in 
household portfolios strengthened  (while transaction  demands weak- 
ened and rates dropped  only moderately),  perhaps  reflecting  a desire to 
be better able to cushion an earnings disruption,  which at that time 
seemed  more  likely. On  the other  hand,  if the opportunity  cost of holding 
MI balances were small, it would reduce incentives for financial  insti- 
tutions  to introduce,  and  depositors  to seek, M1  substitutes,  thus  possibly 
stabilizing  MI holdings. 
The underlying  demand  for narrow  money is probably  being  affected 
by changing  transactions  costs of transferring  between MI and other 
assets. The introduction  of the money market  deposit account in late 
1982  lowered  transactions  costs. At present,  all types of depositors  have 
this convenient and highly attractive  liquid alternative  to holding MI 
deposits. Funds  can be placed  in these accounts  for as short  as overnight 
9. Viewed  alternatively,  the reduction  in the opportunity  cost of holding  MI balances 
results  in a widening  of the trigger  points that prompt  investment  of Ml balances  (when 
the  upper  point  of the Ml holding  range  is reached)  and  liquidation  of an asset to replenish 
such  balances  (when  the lower point  is reached).  Consequently,  holdings  of Ml balances 
are  likely  to vary  more  with all types of transactions-those associated  both  with  income 
and  with  the exchange  of all types of assets. Also, shifting  rate  expectations-which need 
not be universally  or even widely  held-would contribute  to fluctuations  in the demand  to 
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and  transferred  by telephone or automatic  teller machine  to a checking 
account at the same institution;  moreover, the accounts are insured  to 
$100,000  and  have  a principal  that  is fixed.  I?Also,  the  growing  availability 
of repurchase  agreements and money market mutual  funds, most of 
which have convenient withdrawal  privileges, has been adding  to the 
number  of attractive,  low transactions  cost, liquid  investments  available 
as outlets for excess  MI balances. Convenient, low-cost, revolving 
credit  arrangements,  which have become increasingly  available  to both 
households  and  firms,  similarly  enable  depositors  to hold  smaller  amounts 
of transactions  deposits; such credit  arrangements  in effect lower trans- 
actions costs, facilitating  profitable  investment  of transactions  deposits 
as resulting  shortfalls  in transactions  accounts  are covered  by favorably 
priced extensions of credit. It is likely that the public is continuing  to 
adapt  its behavior  to these financial  developments. 
THE  ELECTRONIC  REVOLUTION  AND  OTHER  INFLUENCES 
The  recent  advances  in  electronic  payment  systems  promise  to further 
reduce  transaction  costs and  thus  to alter  payments  practices.  Automated 
clearing  houses are handling  a small but growing  volume of payments, 
and  plans  are  being  made  for same-day  settlement  of electronic  payments 
messages through  these centers. Many automatic  teller machines and 
point-of-sale terminals  permit the depositor to transfer  funds among 
accounts as well as to make  payments;  the number  of these machines  is 
expanding  rapidly,  and experiments  have begun  involving  on-line  with- 
drawals  from  M  I accounts  using  debit  cards.  A large  and  growing  number 
of corporations  currently  have on-line connections to their banks that 
enable them to send payments messages electronically,  reducing  wage 
and salary  costs at both the firm  and  its bank. 
Beyond their  impact  on transactions  costs, many of these electronic 
developments are affecting money demand by reducing uncertainty 
about  daily  receipts  and  expenditures.  Customers  having  on-line  systems 
with their  banks  are able to monitor  more  readily  their  balances  and the 
transactions  flowing  through  their  accounts. Parties  to automated  clear- 
10. Restrictions  apply  to withdrawals  from  money  market  deposit  accounts.  Up to six 
transfers  per month may be made from such accounts, no more than three by draft; 
however, an unlimited  number  of withdrawals  can be made in person, including  those 
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ing house transactions  know in advance when funds are going to be 
transferred  between  accounts. Similarly,  a move to same-day  settlement 
of automated  clearing  house transactions  likely will reduce cash man- 
agers'  uncertainties  about  their  collected, and  thus investable,  balances 
since more will be known about the amount  of daily debits and credits 
to their accounts. The greater the certainty about daily receipts and 
expenditures, the greater is the potential for investing MI balances, 
assuming that opportunity  costs of holding MI balances continue to 
encourage  economization. 
The responsiveness of MI to income may also be undergoing  change 
as a result of these financial  developments. Should  depositors  come to 
view MI deposits as an attractive repository of liquid balances, the 
demand for MI will be influenced  more than previously by portfolio 
considerations.  Inventory  theories of the demand  for transactions  bal- 
ances imply  an income  elasticity  below unity, and  standard  econometric 
models of MI demand  have in the past generally  yielded estimates of 
long-run  income elasticities that are below unity. The demand  for other 
liquid assets,  though, might be inferred to have a long-run income 
elasticity  of unity, owing to the tendency  for income  to vary  proportion- 
ately with wealth, which is the appropriate  scale variable  in portfolio 
models. To the extent that the income elasticity of MI demand  rises 
toward unity, the cyclical behavior of MI can be expected to change, 
with  growth  in M1  more  nearly  matching  growth  of income,  at  least when 
averaged over several quarters. To the extent, though, that wealth 
influences  on MI become more important,  the money-income relation- 
ship in the short run could become looser since the income-wealth 
relationship  is relatively  loose in the short  run. 
Some Implications 
As the above discussion  demonstrates,  rapid  financial  change  contin- 
ues to affect the behavior of MI and thus the setting of MI growth 
objectives. Considerable uncertainty surrounds  the contours of the 
relationship  that  now exists among  Ml, income, interest  rates, and  other 
economic  developments  and  that  will exist once the transition  phase has 
drawn  to a close. Both during  and after the transition,  the reliability  of 
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The preceding  discussion strongly  suggests  that  the interest  elasticity 
of MI demand will be much lower once the deregulation  process has 
ended and that the demand to hold MI balances will continue to be 
"noisy," especially over short periods; in other words, MI can be 
expected to continue  to fluctuate  unpredictably  for reasons that are not 
linked  to variations  in income, interest  rates,  or  other  identifiable  causes. 
Should the relation come to be dominated by noise or by portfolio 
allocation considerations that are only weakly related to income and 
interest  rates, then the issue of MI targeting  might  properly  be relegated 
to discussions of monetary history; attempts to stabilize MI growth 
under  these circumstances  would  only heighten  income  and  interest  rate 
volatility. 
In the event that the relationship  involving  MI, income, and interest 
rates becomes more predictable,  the reduced interest elasticity of MI 
demand  will have implications  for setting  and  revising  monetary  growth 
objectives. Consider  first  the appropriate  setting  of year-to-year  mone- 
tary targets. With either a large or a small elasticity, the longer-term 
objective of reducing  inflation  by slowing spending  growth  by a steady 
amount  each year would translate  into a policy of slowing  over time the 
rate of money growth. However, the smaller  the interest elasticity of 
money  demand,  the more  closely this objective  corresponds  to a uniform 
year-to-year  deceleration  of money stock growth  at the desired  rate of 
reduction  in spending  growth.11  Because of the changes  in interest  rates 
along  the desired  spending  path,  a high  elasticity  would  require  a variable 
rate of  monetary deceleration to  achieve a  steady deceleration of 
spending  growth. 
Indeed, with a high interest elasticity it is actually possible for the 
money growth  target  consistent with a steady deceleration  of spending 
to rise from one year to the next; this would occur if a relatively  large 
decline in interest rates were to occur owing, say, to a large decline in 
inflation  expectations. With a high elasticity, this rate reduction  could 
increase growth in the quantity  of money demanded  by more than the 
deceleration  of income  reduces  growth  in money  demand.  This  has been 
referred  to as the "reentry  problem"  associated with a successful anti- 
inflationary  policy. The acceleration of MI growth in 1982-from 5.1 
11. The result would be similar  if it were assumed that inflation  expectations  and 
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percent in 1981 to 8.8 percent in 1982-at  a time when MI velocity 
declined by an unprecedented  5.4 percent can be viewed as a manifes- 
tation  of the reentry  problem;  as noted above, the greater  importance  of 
fixed-ceiling  NOW accounts in recent years appears  to have increased 
the elasticity of MI with respect to open market  rates and heightened 
this problem. On the other hand, in a completely deregulated  environ- 
ment,  the reentry  problem  would  be lessened since the decline  in interest 
rates accompanying  the decline in inflation  would not have a similarly 
depressing  impact  on velocity. 
In any event, during  the course of a targeting  period  (currently  a year) 
monetary  and goods market  disturbances  will occur, affecting  interest 
rates and income, and producing  departures  of money from  path. With 
a more interest-inelastic  demand  for money, disturbances  can lead to 
different  outcomes  for the money stock, income, and  interest  rates, with 
the difference  depending  on the operating  procedures. 
Under a reserves operating  procedure, such as one focusing on the 
supply of nonborrowed reserves, both goods market and monetary 
(money  demand  and  money supply)  disturbances  will have larger  effects 
on interest  rates  the more  inelastic  is the demand  for money.  12 However, 
for a given setting  of the reserves  instrument,  goods market  disturbances 
will have a smaller impact on income as larger interest rate changes 
cushion  the impact  of spending  disturbances  on income. The heightened 
impact  of monetary  disturbances  on interest  rates, though,  will increase 
the  response  of income. By inducing  larger  changes  in  borrowed  reserves 
and  desired  holdings  of excess reserves, larger  interest  rate  changes  will 
produce  greater  departures  of the money stock from  path  in response  to 
disturbances  from  the goods market  or  from  money  demand.  Departures 
of the money stock from path will tend to be damped,  however, when 
there are money supply disturbances  (such as shifts in excess reserve 
holdings,  the mix of deposits with different  reserve  requirements,  or the 
amount  of borrowed  reserves);  larger  rate  movements  will induce  larger 
changes in borrowings and excess  reserves that partially offset the 
impact  of the money supply  disturbance. 
If the incidence of monetary and spending disturbances  were un- 
changed,  the monetary  authorities  might  wish to offset the heightened 
12. William  Poole, "Optimal  Choice of Monetary  Policy Instruments  in a Simple 
Stochastic  Macromodel,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 84 (May 1970),  pp. 197- 
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impact  of disturbances  on interest  rates and  reestablish  the responses  in 
interest rates and income produced under the more interest-elastic 
money-demand  relationship. This could be achieved by institutional 
changes  to the reserves-based  monetary  control  mechanism  that would 
enhance the responsiveness of the supply of money to interest rate 
changes. These include measures that would increase the interest 
elasticity  of demands  for borrowed  reserves  or excess reserves  (through 
liberalized  carryover), or that would increase the interest elasticity of 
the supply  of nonborrowed  reserves. Measures  that  enhance  the interest 
elasticity of the supply of money would be of even greater  importance 
for stabilization  objectives if the mix of disturbances  were to change, 
with monetary disturbances (in particular,  noise in money demand) 
growing in importance. 
When  disturbances  from any source lead to departures  of the money 
stock from  path, a resetting  of the instrument  (say, the path  for nonbor- 
rowed reserves) is implied. To achieve a given expected change in 
interest  rates and income, smaller  instrument  changes are implied  by a 
less interest-elastic  demand  for money, because a given change in the 
supply  of reserves will have a greater  impact  on interest  rates. Equiva- 
lently, a longer  horizon  for returning  the money stock toward  its annual 
path would be implied  by a smaller  interest elasticity."3  Moreover, the 
ultimate  response of the money stock to a given change  in interest  rates 
(and  income)  would be smaller. 
Under an operating  procedure  that stabilizes the short-term  rate of 
interest  (such as the federal  funds  rate  operating  procedure  in use before 
October  1979),  spending  or monetary  disturbances  will have impacts  on 
income  and  the money  stock  that  are  independent  of the  interest  elasticity 
of money demand.  Adjustment  of the interest  rate instrument  to depar- 
tures  of money  from  path  could  be made  in the same  way as with  a higher 
interest elasticity. But with a lower interest elasticity, the response of 
the money stock to such changes in the interest  rate would be smaller, 
because the quantity  of money demanded  would respond  less. In other 
words, the rate  at which  the money stock  returns  to path  would  be slower 
13. The issue of choosing  the rate  of return  to path  is explored  in Peter  A. Tinsley  and 
others, "Money Market  Impacts  of Alternative  Operating  Procedures,"  in Federal  Re- 
serve  Staff,  New Monetary  Control  Procedures,  vol. 2 (Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
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and  the ultimate  response of the money stock to the readjustment  of the 
instrument  would  be smaller. 
In sum, the rapid pace of  financial change in recent years and 
impending  changes in the future give rise to uncertainties  about the 
reliability  of the narrow  money stock as a guide to monetary  policy, let 
alone the desirability  of rigidly  targeting  monetary  growth. At present, 
the  monetary  system is in transition,  and  the basic  features  of the money- 
income  relationship  are blurred,  implying  heightened  uncertainty  about 
the appropriate  setting  of money stock objectives. The above discussion 
does not predict  whether  uncertainty  about  the velocity relationship  will 
eventually be greater  or less than it was historically,  although  it does 
suggest  that  uncertainty  will  be considerable  during  the transition  period. 
Once the transition  has been completed, it will take time to identify  the 
contours of the new money-income  relationship  and whether noise in 
this  relationship  has  diminished  sufficiently  to warrant  a narrower  annual 
target  range.  The very recent  tendency  for  M1  growth  to conform  closely 
to model forecasts, however, suggests that the relationship  may be 
stabilizing.  Some features  of the money-income  relationship  seem more 
evident  in the longer  run, especially a lower interest  elasticity  of money 
demand. 
The fundamental  question regarding  the usefulness of the money 
stock as a guide to policy once the transition  is complete, though, is 
whether  the money-income  or velocity relationship  will be dominated 
by noise in a new financial environment. A growing array of liquid 
alternatives  to MI balances, lower transactions  costs, and a greater 
tendency for shifting portfolio-allocation  considerations to influence 
money  holdings  could  add  significantly  to the  volatility  of money  demand. 
On the other hand, these factors may prove to be unimportant  and the 
behavior  of money may once again  conform  relatively  closely to varia- 
tions in income and, to a lesser extent than previously, interest rates, 
implying  that stabilization  objectives could be achieved  through  control 
of the money stock. In the meantime,  however, the considerable  degree 
of uncertainty  about velocity behavior  associated with rapid  change to 
the financial  system suggests that the central  bank's ability  to stabilize 
the  economy  through  heavy  reliance  on narrow  money  as an  intermediate 
target  probably  has diminished. Comments 
and Discussion 
Alan S. Blinder: Simpson's  paper  is (in  my words, not his) an intelligent 
brief about why the Federal Reserve should not have done what it did 
between October 1979  and October 1982.  I find  it quite convincing  and 
wonder  if Simpson's  boss does, too. The paper  does five main  things: 
1. Argues that all the financial  innovation  and deregulation  of recent 
years creates a strong a priori  presumption  that money demand 
shifted 
2.  Usefully collects a variety  of empirical  evidence in support  of this 
argument-including simple  velocity calculations,  St. Louis equa- 
tions, and  conventional  money-demand  equations 
3. Offers  an explanation  of recent money-demand  behavior  in terms 
of varying  interest  elasticities 
4.  Speculates  that in the future  the portion  of MI subject  to interest- 
rate regulations will shrink, with the following results: (a) the 
interest elasticity of money demand  will fall, (b) money demand 
will become more sensitive to shifting  asset preferences, and (c) 
money demand will become more related to wealth, as in the 
portfolio  approach,  than  to income,  as in the  transactions  approach 
5. Argues  that  targeting  on money  growth  can be particularly  hazard- 
ous during  a transition  period  like the present  or, I might  add, the 
recent past 
I am in broad  agreement  with each of these points and so will confine 
my remarks  to amplifying  a few of them, picking  a few nits, and putting 
into the author's  mouth  some words about  monetary  policy. 
First, I agree entirely that-given  all that has occurred since, say, 
1978-it  would be surprising  indeed if the demand  for the somewhat 
arbitrary  collection  of assets that  we call  MI had  not shifted  dramatically. 
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But I would  put more emphasis  on the role of inflation,  first,  in inducing 
private financial  innovation to get around increasingly  dysfunctional 
regulations and, second, in persuading  policymakers to change the 
regulations.  I do not imagine  that Simpson  would  disagree  with this, but 
his paper does begin by mentioning "spontaneous market develop- 
ments.  " 
Regarding  shifts  in money demand,  I agree  with Simpson  entirely  and 
never cease to be amazed  at how some people still try to deny that  there 
has been a  shift in the money-income relationship. To  Simpson's 
evidence I simply add the following data, which show that during  the 
nine-quarter  period 1981:1  to 1983:1  there was actually a remarkably 
strong  negative  correlation  between money growth and nominal  GNP 
growth. 
Year  Quarterly growth at annual rates 
and  Nominal  Ml  M2 
quarter  GNP  Ml  velocity  M2  velocity 
1981:1  20.5  4.7  15.1  7.3  12.3 
2  6.6  8.1  -  1.4  10.9  -  3.9 
3  13.3  3.2  9.8  8.3  4.6 
4  3.7  4.6  -0.9  10.9  -6.5 
1982:1  -  1.4  10.7  -  10.9  9.9  -  10.3 
2  6.6  2.2  4.3  7.5  -0.8 
3  2.7  6.3  -  3.4  9.7  -6.4 
4  2.5  16.3  -  11.9  11.0  -7.7 
1983:1  8.2  13.4  -4.6  22.1  -  11.4 
2  13.3  12.1  1.1  11.0  2.1 
3  11.5  9.8  1.5  7.1  4.1 
4  9.1  4.9  4.0  8.7  0.4 
I would only enter a few quibbles  with Simpson's  evidence. First, as 
one who does most of his transactions  through  a broker/dealer  money 
market  mutual fund, I question the concentration  on MI rather  than 
M2-though  I do not think  that replacing  MI by M2 would change the 
qualitative  results  very much.  (The  huge  shift  of funds  into  money  market 
deposit accounts also seems to argue  for using M2.) Second, knowing 
the standard  errors of the equations would help to tell whether the 
prediction  errors  in tables 1 and 2 are "big" or not. Third,  would it not 
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in nominal  terms, as Goldfeld  has suggested,  rather  than  in real terms?' 
I am told this fits the data  better. 
Simpson's  discussion of the effect of institutional  change  on interest 
elasticities is both useful and germane.  His main  point is that the intro- 
duction  of conventional  NOW accounts  (which  pay a fixed, but  positive, 
rate of interest) should be expected to raise the elasticity of money 
demand  with respect to the market  interest  rate, but  the spread  of Super 
NOWs (which pay a floating  rate) should  be expected to lower  it. 
But the Federal Reserve's nonlinear  model apparently  does more 
than  this; it actually  makes  the elasticity  with  respect to the opportunity 
cost vary with the size of opportunity  cost. Simpson shows that the 
nonlinear  model fits the recent episode better than the standard  one. 
What  we would  like to know, of course, is whether  this is simply  a result 
of successful curve-fitting  or really tells us something  about behavior. 
For this reason, it would be nice to have a rationale  for the nonlinear 
specification. 
Talking  about  the future  is much  more  fun  than  talking  about  the past; 
we need not be constrained by facts. For the most part, Simpson's 
crystal ball seems reasonable  to me. I am confident, as he is, that the 
fraction  of balances subject  to interest  rate regulations  will shrink  over 
time. 
Will MI be more portfolio-oriented  than transactions-oriented  in a 
freer financial  environment?  Probably, but that depends a lot on the 
definition  of MI in the year 2000;  there  is no reason  to think  it will be the 
1984 definition.  Will the ratio of Y to M in the future be more or less 
stable than it has been in the past? That, too, must depend on the 
definition. 
Some time after all the regulations  are gone, after  interstate  banking 
is in full swing, after Citibank,  Merrill  Lynch, and the financial  arm  of 
Sears  all  deal  on an  equal  footing  in  deposits,  mortgages,  stock  brokerage, 
insurance,  and so on, a new, stable monetary  order should  emerge. In 
this brave new financial  world, part  of the Federal  Reserve's  job will be 
to draw the M borderline  so as not to place two assets that are perfect 
substitutes  on either side of the border-just  as we would not want a 
monetary  aggregate  that includes quarters  but excludes dimes. If it can 
1. Stephen  M. Goldfeld,  "The Case of the Missing  Money," BPEA,  3:1976,  pp. 683- 
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do this, I do not see why the ratio of Y to M in the future  might  not be 
just as stable  (or  just as unstable!)  as it has been in the past. 
In other  words, while monetarism  may  have suffered  a TKO  in recent 
years, we should  not prematurely  declare  its retirement  from  the ring. 
I come, at last, to monetary  policy. I certainly  agree with Simpson, 
and have said so on several occasions, that all this innovation,  all this 
bouncing  around  of money demand, makes targeting  on the growth  of 
money supply  hazardous  at best during  a transitional  period.  I only wish 
Simpson  had explained  all this to Paul Volcker  in October  of 1979,  as I 
did  to my Princeton  freshmen.  But perhaps  he did. 
Though  Simpson  spends  a good  deal  of time  explaining  why we should 
not use a money target during  the transition  period, he says nothing 
about  what we should  do. Of course, he works  on Constitution  Avenue. 
But I operate  under  no such constraints. 
Much attention  is being accorded  nowadays to abandoning  all inter- 
mediate targets and going directly to nominal GNP targeting. The 
problem,  of course, is that  nominal  GNP  targeting  is not a policy  because 
the Federal  Reserve cannot  control  nominal  GNP. To translate  this idea 
into  a policy, we presumably  need to devise a  feedback  rule  with  changes 
in something  it can control, like bank  reserves or interest  rates, on the 
left-hand  side and deviations of nominal  GNP from target  on the right- 
hand side. I know that none of this is news to the Board's staff, but it 
would  be interesting  to learn  what  is on their  minds  in this regard. 
Some proposals  wind up putting  an intermediate  target  for monetary 
policy on the left-hand  side, and  it seems to me that  two of the principal 
candidates  for this honor now are credit and the real rate of interest.2 
Benjamin  Friedman  has written  extensively about credit, so I will say 
nothing  more  about  that  except to reiterate  the Kaldor-Goodhart-Lucas- 
Murphy  critique:  finding  a constant  credit-income  ratio  during  a period 
in which the Federal Reserve is not controlling  credit does not imply 
that the ratio will remain  constant once credit in the aggregate  is being 
controlled. 
Since economists seem to have ignored  targeting  of real  interest  rates, 
let me advertise  an interesting  working  paper  by Paul  Jenkins  and Carl 
2.  Simpson's  paper  demolishes  money as a candidate,  and the monetarists  long ago 
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Walsh.3  They construct a Poole-type model with flexible prices and 
rational  expectations  and  show that  there  is a strong  case for  real  interest 
rate  targeting-I do not mean  pegging-if financial  sector shocks are the 
dominant  source of disturbances.  This formalizes an intuitive notion 
that some of us have had  for a long time:  that  real interest  rate targeting 
might  make sense in a regime  of rapid  financial  innovation.  It may be an 
idea that  deserves more  thought  than  it has been given to date.4 
General  Discussion 
James Duesenberry  pointed out that the adaptation  of the money- 
income relationship  to deregulation  might have a long way yet to go. 
The velocity of MI was about  two at the end of World  War  II, when the 
opportunity  cost of MI was very low because market  rates were low. 
Velocity tripled  in the period when rising market  rates and continued 
regulation  widened  the opportunity  cost of MI. Now, if the opportunity 
cost is going to be very small again  as a result of deregulation,  velocity 
could conceivably trend all the way back to its early postwar level. It 
was impossible  to forecast  whether  such  a huge  change  would  take  place; 
but the uncertainty  about  where the money-income relationship  would 
head would be very great  for an indeterminate  period  of time. 
Robert  Hall viewed the instability  of the money-income relationship 
as permanent  rather  than  as  just a transitional  problem.  With  MI bearing 
a return closely related to market returns, it becomes a much closer 
substitute  for other assets in the economy. The instability  of velocity, 
which he regarded  as a substantial  problem  throughout  U.S. history, 
will thus become even greater  and  will apply  to any monetary  aggregate, 
because all will be more substitutable  for other assets as the result of 
deregulation.  Benjamin  Friedman  observed that  there  is some evidence 
that  wealth  has historically  helped  to explain  the demand  for money. As 
3. Jenkins  and Walsh, "Real Interest  Rates, Credit  Markets,  and Economic Stabili- 
zation"  (Princeton  University,  October  1983). 
4.  The  principal  differences  between  targeting  nominal  interest  rates  and  targeting  real 
interest  rates  are as follows: (a) With  a nominal  interest  rate  target,  the Federal  Reserve's 
short-run  reaction  to an upward  (downward)  shock  to inflationary  expectations  is to relax 
(restrict)  monetary  conditions  in order  to drive the real rate  down (up). With  a real-rate 
target,  there  is no such  reaction.  (b)  A real  interest  rate  target  is harder  to implement  unless 
and until  there are indexed bonds. Of these differences,  (a) clearly  favors adoption  of a 
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deregulation  makes MI and other monetary aggregates increasingly 
important  as portfolio assets, as distinct from assets held mainly for 
transactions  purposes, fluctuations  in total wealth will now be increas- 
ingly important  in determining  the demand for monetary aggregates, 
including  MI. Because fluctuations  in household financial  wealth are 
dominated  by fluctuations  in common stocks, the relationship  of any 
monetary  aggregate  to income will be more unstable than in the past, 
making  it an inappropriate  target  for the conduct  of policy. 
Ralph  Bryant  took the argument  of unstable  money demands  a step 
further  by emphasizing  the international  aspects of asset choices. As 
national  financial  markets  have become more  integrated,  asset demands 
by domestic residents have become increasingly  responsive to foreign 
variables.  The liquid  assets conventionally  deemed  to be money  become 
closer substitutes  for assets held abroad  and for assets denominated  in 
foreign currencies, which further loosens the relationship between 
domestic money and  nominal  GNP. 
Hall suggested that nominal  GNP was a politically  understandable, 
though imperfect, target on which to focus monetary  policy. This left 
the question of how the Federal  Reserve would conduct  policy so as to 
achieve this target. Of the three usual candidates-reserves  or some 
variant  of it such as the monetary  base, a credit variable, or interest 
rates-Hall  argued  that only nominal  interest  rates were both under  the 
Federal Reserve's control and free of the instability problem. Hall 
proposed raising nominal rates whenever the level of nominal GNP 
exceeded target  and reducing  them in the opposite case. He noted that 
the alternative  of pegging  real interest  rates, which is sometimes  advo- 
cated, adds the needless complexity of trying to infer the expected 
inflation  rate at any moment. Edmund  Phelps added that aiming  for a 
real interest  rate target  was dangerous  because the appropriate  level of 
real  rates was unknowable.  Structural  changes,  including  changes  in the 
structural  budget deficit, alter the appropriate  level of the real interest 
rate  for stabilization  policy. 
Phelps  objected  to targeting  nominal  GNP because  it implied  that  real 
growth and inflation should always be traded-off  evenly. He saw no 
reason  for policymakers  to accept higher  inflation  if real  growth  slowed 
for  reasons  that  might  be permanent,  or to aim  for deflation  if real  growth 
were to surge. Rather  he proposed stabilizing  growth  of money wages, 
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of a nominal  GNP target  a step  further,  arguing  that  such  a formula  could 
never be expected to guide what is essentially a political-economic 
process. Like Phelps, he questioned  whether  we should  always, or even 
usually, want to change  real GNP by 1 percent  to offset every 1 percent 
shock to the price level. But even for the longer run, periods when 
inflation  control  is the  main  political  concern  would  alternate  with  periods 
when  mass unemployment  is the major  worry.  Controlling  nominal  GNP 
is currently  popular  because it puts a ceiling on inflation;  but at other 
times it might limit the improvement  in employment that could be 
accomplished  when that  is the major  problem.  Duesenberry  also warned 
that  policy could not use debt as an instrument  of control  because, short 
of instituting  credit controls, policy could not control debt directly; 
furthermore,  the observed correlation  between debt and nominal  GNP 
came largely  from  GNP giving  rise to debt. 
Bryant  argued  for a sharper  distinction  between ultimate  targets  for 
policy and the instruments  used to try to achieve those targets, and 
between instrument  choice and the procedures  used to vary the instru- 
ments. A rule for policy could pertain  only to an instrument.  Bryant 
argued  against  an instrument  rule  and  advocated  an eclectic approach  to 
policy that allows the Federal Reserve to look at and respond to a 
number  of developments. The long-run  benefits of a credible policy 
commitment  could perhaps  be realized  by a policy stance that  promised 
to react to some types of economic disturbances  but to remain  passive 
in the face of others. Such  a "halfway"  approach  to discretionary  policy 
might  be a constructive  compromise  between  the rigidity  of simple  rules 
and the possible credibility problems associated with unconstrained 
activism. 
Thomas  Simpson  defended  the case for monetary  targeting,  although 
with more flexibility than many of its advocates would permit. He 
reasoned  that monetary  targeting  provides  the public  with timely infor- 
mation about monetary  developments. If actual outcomes differ from 
target, the public can infer either that actual economic developments 
will  be different  than  they had  expected, or  that  policymakers  will  explain 
why there had been a change in the relationship  between these devel- 
opments and the monetary targets. In this process, the monetary 
authorities  will be sensitive to the public's  preferences  and will, before 
long,  alter  their  targets  if public  preferences  demand  it. Simpson  regarded 
the episode of 1979-83  as an example of this kind of role for monetary 
targeting. 